[T]he illusion is not on the side of knowledge, it is already on the side of reality itself, of what the people are doing. What they do not know is that their social reality itself, their activity, is guided by an illusion, by a fetishistic inversion. What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. They know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know. The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion is what may be called the ideological fantasy.

If our concept of ideology remains the classic one in which the illusion is located in knowledge, then today’s society must appear post-ideological: the prevailing ideology is that of cynicism; people no longer believe in ideological truth; they do not take ideological propositions seriously. The fundamental level of ideology, however, is not of an illusion masking the real state of things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself. And at this level, we are of course far from being post-ideological society. Cynical distance is just one way — one of many ways — to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them.

It is from this standpoint that we can account for the formula of cynical reason proposed by Sloterdijk: ‘they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it’. If the illusion were on the side of knowledge, then the cynical position would really be a post-ideological position, simply a position without illusions: ‘they know what they are doing, and they are doing it’. But if the place of the illusion is in the reality of doing itself, then this formula can be read in quite another way: ‘they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it’.

– Slavoj Žižek, “How Did Marx Invent the Symptom?”

批判犬儒，切勿忘記寬容。

冠名之重要，顯見於無名之苦。

凡事沒有名號，不能言語，不談不論，必然不倫不類，不合情、不合理、不合法，猶如黑幫暗號，永遠被排拒於社會常識之外，無法思辯、論證，不可定義、曲解，難以誇張、抹黑，不能讚揚、迷信，更遑論聲討、騎劫。

名稱不難深入民心，但其所指所意卻是權勢之爭。

相同稱號，可解出語意長短；冠以同一名稱，視乎語境變異，大可興仁揚義，當然亦可助紂為虐。

權貴習慣掏空語言，玩弄冠名如以謊圓謊，最容易言過其實。共犯者瞞心昧已，輕則自曝其短，重則自誤誤人，淪為惡俗 ── 此等有名無實的惡俗雖源自冠名，不受罪於無名之空乏，卻偏偏最教人勞累氣結，不堪言狀。

你大概可以喋喋不休說上數分鐘，而且你心中有數，知道自己交足功課，已經優勝過很多漫不經心、啞口無言的人了。

我坐在對頭，不願意怪責你人云亦云、虛言巧語，也不希望抺殺你試圖「學以置用」的努力，只想知道，真的很想知道，除了在面試和自我介紹（信）中如此慷慨陳述，你對無理取鬧的客戶陪笑道歉時，你下班後站在擁擠得失去尊嚴的地鐵車廂時，是否仍然相信，自己是真真正正的勝利者？

抑或，你早就心知肚明，其實這一副（準）職場精英的裝扮，不過是順應大會規定的基本造型而己？

博物館外，中年女子不動聲色走到滿身銀色油彩的小丑藝人身旁，她的同伴趕緊按下快門，一二三笑，拍照完畢，她轉身就走，冷不提防小丑向她示威：「I know the economy is bad, but you can at least say thank you!」；儘管那口操北美口音的女子百般推搪，仍然萬口莫辯。

乙

印裔餐廳經理熱情招呼一群十六七歲的英藉大男生。他問：「Do you like some beer?」 對方卻群起以爛 gag 回應：「No, but I like you, my Indian friend!」肥經理裝作沒聽見，繼續落單寫菜。這些電視肥皂劇對白可能太耳熟能詳了吧？

丙

我租了單車代步，車身印上了租車公司的名字 Yellow Bike，踏到哪裡都清楚標示遊客身份。在公園小息期間，紋身漢向我答訕，笑問：「Yellow man on a yellow bike?」，我不覺得太冒犯，卻忍不住回報一句：「Hi yourself, a white man in a white shirt?」如此，對話沒多久就中斷了。

丁

在短途機上，空姐正收回點心茶餐的餐具。我怕目的地的廉價旅館太混賬，甚麼都沒有，希望留起那組未用的塑膠刀叉：「Can I keep this?」她點頭微笑，還不忙送上熱情讚美：「Thanks for helping save the environment!」最後，當然誰都沒釐清這美麗的小誤會。

K. 當然可以猶豫、推辭、放棄，免受折磨、尷尬、誘惑。雖然 K. 不在法庭，也不知道誰是對手、自己面對什麼指控，但 K. 希望狠狠一辯。

對方如此陳詞：「我們不必承認所有事情都是真的；只要看待成必然，就可接受。」

K. 的回應很簡單：「怪不得說謊已變為普世原則了。」

這麼多年以後，我終於真正明白 K. 為何如此沮喪。那循環論證的邏輯圈套太不堪一擊，又太牢不可破 —— 更何況，現在是整個國家機器出盡力氣去撒謊。